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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Existential Meaning: its Functions and Origins
What should a person who cares about the sanctity of life do to someone
who violates his or her cherished attitudes towards abortion? It would seem
strange for such a person to commit acts of persecution in the name of pro-life
attitudes, but pro-life advocates have committed acts of violence against people
who challenge their convictions, such as the murder of abortion doctor George
Tiller in Wichita, Kansas (Democracy Now, 2012). The fact that people are
willing to go to great lengths to defend their threatened attitudes suggests that
attitudes have properties that grant people feelings of meaning, leading them to
defend, instead of change attitudes. It seems likely that some attitudinal
dimensions, such as importance (Boninger, Krosnick & Berent, 1995), certainty
(Budd, 1986), or, importantly, moral conviction (Skitka, 2010), may create
existential meaning (Lyon & Younger, 2005; Mascaro & Rosen, 2006) that makes
them worth defending. Strong attitudes may create a sense of meaning, moral
conviction may increase meaning, and people may moralize threatened attitudes
to increase existential meaning.
Meaning and its Conceptualization
Meaning can refer to a sense of “cosmic specialness” (Landau, Greenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski & Martins, 2006; Von Tongeren & Green, 2010) that one
adopts to manage existential concerns, (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski &
Lyon, 1989). Meaning can also refer to “predicted or expected connecting links,
relationships, and properties between, or shared by external events” (Baumeister,
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1991; Baumeister & Vohs, 2002; Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006). Meaning can
refer to the coherence of more mundane events, such as relationships between
physical events or objects in the environment (Bruner & Postman, 1949). For
example, people who are presented with cards of impossible combinations of suit
and color feel as if they inhabit a type of paradigm purgatory and are unable to
articulate what makes these apparently anomalous features strange (Bruner &
Postman, 1949). This suggests that a lack of coherence leads to a sense of
meaninglessness.
Psychologists have described meaning as the ability to create connecting
links between environmental events, aspects of the self, the social groups one
belongs to, and one’s own actions (Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997;
Van den bos, 2009; Van den bos et al. 2007; Hogg, 2007; Heine, Proulx & Vohs,
2006; Steger, Frasier, Oishi & Kaler, 2006). People are able to connect social
proscriptions into a set of coherent worldviews that relate to the self and others
(Markus, 1977) creating a sense the world is coherent place (Koltko-Rivera,
2004). The belief that life operates in continuity allows people to feel the world is
meaningful. A specific sense of existential meaning (i.e. meaningfulness) allows
people to form coherent links between environmental events, personal beliefs, and
social interactions. People can feel existentially meaningful in the absence of
environmental coherence, and may even feel a sense of existential meaning
amidst external chaos however. Hence, meaning derived from a sense of
environmental coherence, and meaning derived from a sense of existential
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meaningfulness, are not unrelated, but existential meaning allows people to feel
meaningful in the absence of outward tranquility.
Existential meaning fluctuates in relation to life events (Lyon & Younger,
2005; Mascaro & Rosen, 2006). A person may feel that life has a greater purpose
because of a great cause or project. and feel they will live on symbolically after
they die because of their accomplishments (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski &
Lyon, 1989; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland &
Lyon, 1990). Developing existential meaning is important to alleviate anxiety.
Henie et al, 2006). I focus solely on existential meaning for the remainder of this
paper.
Theoretical Models of Meaning and Purpose
Feelings of existential meaning have a powerful impact on psychological
health (Mascaro & Rosen, 2006; Speck & Higginson, 2004), happiness
(McGregor & Little, 1998), and fulfillment (Ventegodt, Jorgen Andersen &
Merrick, 2003). Terror (Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989;
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, Kirkland & Lyon, 1990)
and Uncertainty Management theories (van den Bos & Lind, 2002) propose that
people seek existential meaning to escape their own mortality, People attempt to
alleviate their fears by adopting cultural worldviews (Rosenblatt, Greenberg,
Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989), and to gain self-esteem by adhering to
these worldviews (Greenberg, Solomon & Pyszczynski, 1997). Cultural
worldviews create self-esteem by allowing people to feel as if the good works that
they have done in life will ‘live on” in a sense after they die, allowing them to feel
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as if they are symbolically immortal. Cultural worldviews also quell uncertainty
by giving people a framework with which to operate in life.
In a similar vein, Uncertainty Identity theorists (Hogg, 2000; Hogg,
Hofman & Rivera, 2008) state that people dislike uncertainty, and believe that
people seek membership in entitative groups to alleviate uncertainty (Bar-Tal,
1990; 2000; Campbell, 1958; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Deutch, 1968;
Kruglanski et al., 2006; Merton, 1957). These groups have close boundaries, little
tolerance for deviance from norms, authoritative leadership to fulfill the need to
belong (Baumeister, 1995) and alleviate are capable of alleviating uncertainty.
The Sociometer Model (Hogg et al. 2008; Leary, Tambor, Terdal &
Downs, 1995) proposes that people join groups to fulfill the need to belong. This
model states that the need to belong, rather than uncertainty per se, is the primary
motive behind group membership, and self-esteem associated with group
membership is a gauge of successful group inclusion. Regardless of the specific
motives for seeking a sense of belonging, adherence to groups creates meaning by
allowing people to feel accepted (Johnson et al., 2006), providing support for
worldviews and giving people the sense that they fit into something greater than
themselves (Hogg, 2007).
Although the fear of death, uncertainty, the need to belong, and a desire
for self-esteem may all drive people’s attempts to search for things associated
with living a meaningful life, such as adherence to cultural worldviews, selfesteem, and group belonging, some theorists propose that the desire for existential
meaning and a meaningful life in and of itself may be an intrinsic human drive
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(Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006). They argue that people seek certainty and closure,
adhere to worldviews, desire self-esteem, and search for symbolic immortality
primarily to create existential meaning.
The Meaning Maintenance Model
The Meaning Maintenance Model (Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006) offers a
promising framework subsuming previous theories with regards to the creation of
existential meaning. Meaning maintenance theorists test the claim that selfesteem, certainty and closure, affiliation, and symbolic immortality are increased
when people feel that meaning is lacking, and argue that when one source of
meaningfulness is not available that another is substituted. This process is called
“fluid compensation” (Heine, Proulx & Vohs, 2006; Proulx & Heine, 2006;
Steele, 1988), and can occur either within or between domains. When one aspect
of meaning is threatened, people attempt to repair the damage done to that
dimension of meaning. For instance, a threat to self-esteem may decrease a
person’s sense of meaning, and people may attempt to restore self-esteem (a form
of within domains compensation; e.g, Baumeister & Jones, 1978; Cialdini et al.,
1976; Leary et al., 1995) to compensate for this loss. People may also attempt to
increase affiliation (a between-domains compensation; Cialdini et al., 1976).
Overall, meaning maintenance theorists assert that increasing one facet of
meaning increases overall meaning
Attitudes, Their Strength and Dimensions, Existential Meaning and Fluid
Compensation
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Attitudes can be defined as general, enduring evaluations comprised of
cognition, emotion, and behavior (Petty & Cacioppo, 1988). They may contribute
to existential meaning by increasing its facets. Attitudes may create a sense of
symbolic immortality, increase one’s sense of affiliation through adherence to
shared group beliefs, increase self-esteem through these venues, and offer a sense
of certainty and closure. The relationship between the components of meaning
outlined in the meaning maintenance model, and attitudes, a set of relationships
that has not been explicitly explored to date, will be discussed the following
sections. Attitudes can coalesce into stable worldviews (Golec & Van Bergh,
2007; Jost et al., 2003; Solomon et al., 2000), and may also create a sense of
existential meaning and increase its facets in the same fashion that worldviews
fulfill this role.
Attitude Strength
Attitudes are complex and consist of a variety of dimensions and strong
attitudes lead to a variety of cognitive and behavioral outcomes (Petty, 1995).
Attitude strength is the extent to which an attitude is important (Boninger,
Krosnick & Berent, 1995), certain (Budd, 1986), extreme (Tannenbaum, 1956), or
a core part of one’s moral beliefs and convictions (Ableson, 1995). Strong
attitudes may be more able than weak attitudes to instill a sense of symbolic
immortality (Lifton, 1973), certainty and closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994),
affiliation (Hogg, Adelman & Blagg, 2010), and self-esteem (Greenberg, Simon,
Pyszczynski, Solomon & Chatel, 1992).
Attitudes and Symbolic Immortality
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Because of their ability to cohere into stable worldviews, adhering to, and
living in accordance with strong attitudes may help create symbolic immortality
through social validation. Terror management theorists state that fear of death
causes adherence to worldviews to alleviate fear (Rosenblatt et el, 1989), creating
the sense beliefs are of lasting value. Although the effects of adherence to
attitudes (as opposed to overall worldviews) on symbolic immortality have not
been specifically investigated, evidence suggests people adhere strongly to
attitudes to bolster worldviews (Rosenblatt et al., 1989). Other researchers
(Emerson, 1996) propose that worldviews allow people to make sense of the
world by shaping interpretations of the environment and predisposing people
towards specific attitudes and actions. These conceptions of worldviews and their
relation to attitudes support the idea that adherence to attitudes may allow people
to gain a sense of symbolic immortality.
Important attitudes may be capable of creating symbolic immortality by
allowing people to believe their attitudes matter. The fact that people are more
punitive towards those who violate cultural values under mortality salience
(Rosenblatt, 1989) suggests that they adhere more strongly to their already
existing cultural values when death is made salient. If important attitudes, like
worldviews, allow people to cling to a sense of symbolic immortality, they may
create a sense of meaning.
Attitudes held with certainty may be capable of creating symbolic
immortality. Because people create a sense of symbolic immortality to feel that
their impact on the world will continue after death, feeling certain about a
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particular attitude may allow that attitude to create meaning and perpetuity.
Attitudes experienced with a sense of certainty may grant a sense immortality by
allowing people to feel certain that the benefits of their adherence to attitudes will
live on.
Attitudes, Certainty, and Closure
Attitudes may allow people to feel a sense of certainty and closure (Webster
& Kruglanski, 1994). Theory regarding effectance motivation (White, 1959)
suggests that people adopt worldviews (composed of attitudes) to gain a sense of
predictability. For instance, people in meritocratic cultures may adopt attitudes
suggesting that hard work leads to success (McCoy & Major, 2007), constituting
“knowledge” about the relationship between a variable (work) and an outcome,
(success). This may grant a person a sense of predictability and closure because
knowledge of cause and effect allows them to predict their own personal life
outcomes based on their present work ethic. This research seems more indicative
of meaning as defined by a sense of coherence, but as mentioned, the coherence
people witness with regards to their beliefs and how they play out in the
environment may also help to create a sense of existential meaning. For example,
people who work hard and hold meritocratic beliefs may feel especially
meaningful when their hard work really does lead to success, in line with their
own expectations.
Attitudes that are held with a sense of importance may create certainty and
closure because they are stable and resistant to change (Fine, 1957; Gorn, 1975;
Schuman & Presser, 1981; Zuwerink, 1996), lead people to store object-relevant
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information more effectively in memory, and to weigh object-relevant
information more heavily (Berent, Krosnick & Boninger, 1997). Attitudes held
with certainty may create a sense of closure because they lend a sense of
correctness and clarity to one’s perceptions (Petrocelli, Tormala & Rucker, 2007),
and are resistant to persuasive attacks (Tormala & Petty, 2002; Wu & Schaffer,
2007).
Attitudes and Affiliation
Attitudes may allow people to identify with social groups (Kruglanski,
Manetti & DeGrada, 2006), and to become prototypical group members (Hogg,
2000). Groups have been defined as three or more people who share the same
social identity and group Identification has been defined as a feeling of belonging,
a definition and evaluation of self in terms of shared ingroup attributes, and a
belief that the group is central to one’s sense of self (e.g., Cameron, 2004; Hogg
et al, 2007, pg. 3). Feeling like a prototypical group member allows people to selfenhance and reduce uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Strong attitudes may lead people to adhere strongly to attitudinally similar
groups (Cartwright and Zander, 1968; Evans, 1986; Frank, 1957). Important
attitudes may be a source of affiliation and group adherence because they strongly
impact social perception and social behavior, such as voting preferences
(Krosnick, 1986, Schuman & Presser, 1981; Skitka & Bauman, 1998). Attitudes
held with certainty facilitate connections within tight-knit groups (Visser &
Marabile, 2004), serving as a rallying point for like-minded individuals and
creating affiliation.
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Attitudes and Self-esteem
Adhering to personal and group attitudes may increase self-esteem.
According to terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1992), people derive a
sense of self-esteem by adhering to the worldviews prescribed by their particular
culture. The link between adhering to attitudes and self-esteem has not been
explicitly tested, but the link between worldviews and attitudes suggests attitude
adherence affects self-esteem. Worldviews guide and organize attitudes (Luker,
1984), so adhering to attitudes may also increase self-esteem. Some studies
provide support for the idea that attitudes relate to self-esteem. Latinos with
meritocratic, compared to non-meritocratic worldviews who experienced
prejudice (a threat to their worldview) experienced a decrease in self-esteem and
(Major et al., 2007). These findings suggest that confirming peoples’ views
increases self-esteem. In addition, people high in self-esteem react to self-identity
threats with increased adherence to worldviews.
Important attitudes may also increase self-esteem. For example, research
demonstrates that adherence to cultural worldviews, a powerful guide of attitudes
(Koltko-Rivera, 2004) amongst immigrant groups, leads to greater positive selfregard (Hetts, Sakuma & Pelham, 1998). Attitude certainty is also related to high
self-esteem, such that people with high self-esteem tend to experience more
clarity and attitudinal certainty (Campbell, 1990).
Moral Conviction as a Potential Source of Meaning.
Increasing strength on any specific attitudinal dimension may allow
people to bolster the constructs that create meaning. Some attitudinal dimensions,

11
particularly the moral dimension (Skitka, 2010), may be especially capable of
creating a sense of existential meaning. Moral conviction is distinct from other
attitudinal dimensions and represents the extent to which an attitude is a
core part of a person’s moral beliefs and values (Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis,
2005; Skitka, 2010). Moral convictions differ from non-moral attitudes
because they are experienced as objective and universal (Skitka, 2010).
The moral dimension of attitudes may seem similar to attitude
certainty, there are important differences between these two attitudinal
dimensions. Non-moral attitudes are held because of preference or social
convention, but moral convictions are seen as inherently correct. Moral
convictions may create existential meaning by imbuing an attitude with an
ultimate sense of what is correct. This may lead people to believe that
adhering to a moral conviction is synonymous with adherence to an absolute
truth or meaning.
Threats to Attitudes and Meaning
People engage in compensatory processes when their attitudes and sense
of meaning are threatened. As will be described shortly, people often cling to their
beliefs to a greater extent when constructs such as self-esteem, closure and
certainty are threatened. Similar responses to attitude threat have been
documented as well. This research supports the idea that people engage in fluid
compensation when constructs that help to create meaning are threatened.
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Threats to Meaning, its Facets, and Compensatory Measures
Increased adherence to attitudes (i.e. “compensatory zeal”; McGregor &
Marigold; 2003) may be a way to compensate for low implicit self-esteem. People
with high explicit self-esteem and low implicit self-esteem react with
compensatory zeal when made to think about personal uncertainty about a valuerelevant aspect of their lives. This suggests that threatened self-esteem can lead to
compensatory zeal, a possible way to cope with meaning threats.
Threatening attitudes may decrease certainty. For example, researchers
(McGregor, Zanna, Holmes & Spencer, 2001) threatened participants’ certainty
using a deliberative mindset task (Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995) asking them to
elaborate on conflicting values, goals, and possible selves. Participants who
engaged in this task felt greater uncertainty than in a condition in which they
though about the dilemmas of a friend, and responded with greater adherence to
their attitudes about social issues. These findings suggest that a threat to one’s
certainty about personal values leads them to compensate by increasing the
strength of their attitudes.
Threatening symbolic immortality leads people to strengthen their beliefs.
People gain symbolic immortality by adhering to cultural beliefs and standards
(Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski & Lyon, 1989). Terror management theory
holds that cultural worldviews are constantly under threat. Because cultural
worldviews drive attitudes, it seems likely that attitudes are also under constant
threat from a variety of disparate and dissenting sources. For example people who
violate cultural standards (e.g. a prostitute) elicit harsher treatment when mortality
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was salient (Greenberg et al., 1989). Participants recommended especially harsh
punishment (high bonds) for a prostitute when mortality was made salient.
Mortality salience leads people to feel more negatively towards outgroup
members (Greenberg, et al., 1990;), and people critical of their social groups
(Dechense, Janssen & van Knippenberg, 2000). These findings reinforce the idea
that attitudes protect against the fear of death, which would lead participants to
behave especially punitively towards attitude violators.
Overall, research suggests and meaning attitudes are linked, and people
attempt to compensate for threats to these facets of meaning by increasing the
strength of their attitudes. These results do not explicitly demonstrate that
attitudes create meaning, but they do establish links between facets of meaning
and attitudes. Other research indicates that people compensate for threats to
attitudes by increasing their strength.
Threats to Attitudes and Compensatory Measures.
People engage in compensatory processes (Cooper & Fazio, 1984;
Festinger, 1957) to align attitudes with current behaviors they may have
previously disapproved of (a realization that may cause dissonance; Aronson,
1968 ; Greenwald & Ronis, 1978). People may also react to threats to attitudes by
becoming more attached to them (Lord, Ross & Lepper, 1979).
Threats to attitudes may affect a person’s sense of affiliation. Attitudes can
bind groups together (Friedkin, 2004; Hogg, Adelman & Blagg, 2011), so threats
to attitudes may threaten the foundations of group affiliation. Research offers
indirect support for this hypothesis. Threats to the beliefs of a group lead
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participants high in need for closure to adhere more strongly to their group, but
participants low in need for closure to distance themselves from the group
(Dechense et al. 2000). In a famous account, Festinger and colleagues (1956)
infiltrated an American cult whose leader proclaimed the imminent arrival of a
cataclysmic flood and flying saucers to rescue the group. After these predictions
failed to occur, the group as a whole became even more convinced of the validity
of its beliefs, thinking earth was spared because of their dedication. They began to
actively spread their message, as opposed to keeping it secret as they had done
before. Similar results have been found in related research that demonstrates that
groups become more cohesive when opinion-deviants emerge (Schacter, 1951;
Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco & Leve, 1992). Together, these studies suggest that
attitudes serve as a rallying point for social affiliation.
Evidence suggests that strong attitudes may be especially likely to lead to
motivated reasoning (Baron, 2000; Nickerson, 1998; Oswald & Grosjean 2004;
Risen & Gilovich, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 1996). For instance, when threatened
attitudes are important, people are more likely to proselytize on their behalf (Gal
& Rucker, 2010). Emotions characterized by certainty are more likely to lead
people to ignore the quality of arguments, engage in heuristic processes, and
stereotype (Tiedens & Linton, 2001). Overall, it seems people are more likely to
defend strong attitudes than weaker ones.
Moral Conviction: A Potent Source of Meaning Under Threat?
Evidence suggests that adherence to moral convictions may be an especially
potent tool for imbuing life with a sense of meaningfulness (Van Tongeren et al.,
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2010, Van Tongeren & Green, 2011). By imbuing threatened attitudes with a
sense of morality, people may be able to restore and protect meaning when
strongly held attitudes are threatened. Several properties of the moral dimension
of attitudes make it particularly likely that this moral dimension may be increased
in response to attitude threat.
Attitudes that are not imbued with moral conviction can be important,
certain, and extreme. However, people are aware that these attitudes reflect
personal preference, realize they are not socially mandated, and tolerate people
who do not share similar strong preferences (Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005;
Skitka, 2010). For example, a person’s preference for vacations in Maui as
opposed to Texas may be quite important to them (if they feel pride about a
Hawaiian heritage for example). They may be certain of this preference, and hold
extreme attitudes towards their support of Hawaiian vacations. However, a strong
preference such as this will not elicit the same ire towards people who disagree
with them, as would a moral conviction, because the person holding these strong
attitudes will realize that their attitudes simply reflect a preference others are free
to disagree with without consequences. Social conventions are similar to
preferences, but are adhered to by specific groups. For instance, people in a
particular nation as a whole may prohibit spitting in the street, feel this is
important, and hold certain and extreme attitudes towards “no spitting laws”.
However, if there is no moral imperative behind these strong attitudes, citizens
will likely take no offense when other societies decide that spitting is acceptable,
agree on it, and implement no law against it.
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Moral convictions are different from preferences and social proscriptions
because they generalize across group boundaries and situations. People who hold
strong moral convictions believe that their moral beliefs represent the core of
what is right and wrong (Haidt, 2001, 2007; Mullen & Skitka, 2006; Skitka &
Mullen, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2008). Subsequently, increasing one’s
sense that an attitude is a moral imperative may help them to shore up a strongly
held attitude when it is threatened more so then simply viewing the attitude as
more important or certain. The idea that an attitude is objective, universal, and
apparent may help people to “close the book” on attitudes that are threatened so to
speak, and give them a sense of finality in regards to their attitude’s validity.
Increasing one’s moral conviction with regards to a particular attitude may help
protect and defend attitudes. Because moral imperatives are viewed as objective
and universal, they are less likely to be altered or disrupted than simple
preferences, or even social rules.
In addition to its potential for increasing the perceived validity of an
attitude, increasing the morality of an attitude may also be especially capable of
increasing a person’s sense of existential meaning (Van Tongeren et al., 2010,
Van Tongeren & Green, 2011). Because of its objective and universal qualities,
moral conviction may instill beliefs with a sense of lastingness, increasing
symbolic immortality and certainty. Increasing moral conviction may allow
people to feel a greater sense of self-esteem and self worth by adhering to
righteous beliefs, and may create a more powerful hub around which people can
gain a sense of affiliation and association (Haidt & Kesibir, 2010).
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Little research has explicitly examined if moral convictions increase one’s
sense of existential meaning. Some studies suggest it may be an important
component in the cultivation of meaning. Some researchers (Van Tongeren et al.,
2010; Van Tongeren & Green, 2011a) posit that morality may be a powerful
source of existential meaning. They find that telling people they are immoral
decreases meaning (Van Tongeren & Green, 2011a). People also view the act of
flipping a switch or shoving a man from a bridge in order to prevent a train from
hitting five people, and only hitting one person as less moral when they were led
to focus on meaninglessness as opposed to death, uncertainty, or pain (Jarvis
&Thompson, 1976). This suggests that moral schemas may be activated to a
greater extent when meaning is threatened. To the extent that attitude threat
reduces existential meaning, people may attempt to bolster moral frameworks to
increase meaning.
The Consequences of Moral Convictions
Although morality and moral convictions may contribute to one’s sense of
meaning in life, holding an attitude with moral conviction can lead people to
behave aggressively. Because moral convictions are seen as objective and
universal (and because they may create a sense of meaningfulness), people feel
that it is imperative that they defend them at any cost. Theorists and researchers
find that people feel stronger emotional reactions to threats to their moral
convictions than non-moral but strong attitudes (Haidt, 2001; 2003; Kohlberg,
1984; Nucci, 2001; Shweder, 2002; Skitka, 2010). For instance people feel an
exacerbated sense of contempt and disgust towards people who threaten their
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moral beliefs (Haidt, 2003; Lazarus, 1991; Skitka, 2010; Skoe, Eisenberg, &
Cumberland, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), but also a greater sense
of elation and awe toward those who uphold them (Haidt, 2003b). These powerful
emotions can lead people to behave in ways that are not normally considered
socially acceptable. For instance, Mullen and Skitka (2006) found that
participants who read a scenario in which a person is either convicted (or
acquitted) of a crime responded with anger, and the belief that the procedures of
the trial in which they were acquitted were unfair, to the extent to which the
defendant’s morals matched (or did not match) their own. This suggests that the
strong emotion associated with moral beliefs biases people towards ends that fit
their moral beliefs.
Other influential research demonstrates that people have strong reactions to
threats to their moral beliefs even when unable to rationally discern why exactly
they have such reactions. Haidt & Björklund (2000) presented subjects with a
variety of bizarre scenarios (a family eating their dead dog, incest between a
brother and sister using birth control and other contraceptives) and asked them
whether or not the actions described in them were morally acceptable. Although
nobody was harmed in the scenarios, participants were sure of the immorality of
the acts but could not rationally explain why. In combination, these programs of
research demonstrate that moral beliefs are associated with stronger reactions than
simple strong attitudes, and that these strong reactions and emotions seem to have
primacy over reason when it comes to moral judgments.
In line with research demonstrating that people attempt to shore up the
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validity of threatened attitudes or meaning by increasing attitude strength, people
may also be willing to support more overt, and even illegal or potentially harmful
actions to the extent that they threaten their attitudes or sense of meaning. For
instance, the extent to which a person felt that physician assisted suicide was
a core part of their moral beliefs and values predicted judgments of
procedural fairness, decision acceptance, and the legitimacy of the Supreme
Court after it ruled in favor of state’s rights to allow physician assisted
suicide (Wisneski, Lytle & Sktika, 2009). To the extent that participants were
opposed to physician-assisted suicide pre-ruling, they believed the ruling to
be unacceptable, the procedures leading up to the ruling to be unfair, and
discounted the legitimacy of the Supreme Court to be diminished. Overall,
research suggests that, contrary to early seminal studies on authority
(Milgram, 1965, 1974), authority figures and institutions may not always
have the power to drive people to commit atrocities (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle,
2008). In fact, people seem to be quite willing to defy authority figures and
discount their legitimacy when they violate moral convictions, and may
actually use the congruence between the level that an authority figure or
institution adheres to one’s moral values as a litmus tests for the legitimacy
of the institution (Wisneski, Lytle & Sktika, 2009).
Moral convictions also lead people to behave in harmful ways, and engage
in harmful actions against moral violators. For instance, participants desired
greater social as well as physical distance from people believed to violate their
moral convictions, showed more universal intolerance of morally dissimilar others
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in intimate and distant relationships, expressed less goodwill and cooperativeness
in attitudinally-heterogeneous groups, and displayed a general inability to derive
procedures to solve disagreements. In addition, people who believe their moral
convictions have been violated were also more willing to accept extreme
sacrifices, and even approved of vigilantism to repair moral wrongdoings (Skitka
& Houston, 2001; Skitka & Morgan, 2009). I expect the extent to which an
attitude is moralized in response to threat may lead people to approve of antisocial behavior, greater social distance towards and social distance from attitude
violators, and to see institutions who violate strong attitudes as less legitimate, all
based on moral mandate effects.
Rationale
The purpose of the present studies was to test the extent to which
threatening a person’s attitudes leads them to increase their sense of existential
meaning in life. If attitudes really do create a sense of meaning in life, then
threatening attitudes should lead people to attempt to increase their overall sense
of meaning, as well as the four facets of meaning proposed by the meaning
maintenance model. I also set out to test whether or not a specific facet of attitude
strength, moral conviction, increases in response to attitude threat.
In addition to examining whether or not people report a greater sense of
existential meaning and moral conviction in response to attitude threat, I assessed
the extent to which moral conviction specifically can serve as a mechanism
through which to create a sense of existential meaning. Moral conviction and
meaning may both increase in response to attitude threat, and moral conviction
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may mediate the threat to meaning relationship. This does not necessarily mean
that moral conviction causes an increase in existential meaning however. Because
moral conviction may have special properties that allow it to be an especially
powerful creator of meaning in response to attitude threat, I explicitly tested
whether an increase in attitude morality following a threat to people’s attitudes
(and especially strong attitudes) leads to an increase in their sense of existential
meaning and its facets.
Finally, I tested the extent to which people exhibit increased protective
behavior indicative of moral mandates when their attitudes are threatened. To the
extent that people increase their sense of moral conviction surrounding a
particular attitude when the attitude is threatened, I expect that they will be
willing to endorse vigilante justice towards people they perceive as threatening
the attitude in question, and prefer increased social distance from them.
CHAPTER II: INTRODUCTION STUDY 1
Much research is based on the idea that meaning is a powerful motivating
force, but no explicit test has been conducted to assess whether or not attitudes
create meaning. In addition, no work has been conducted to assess whether or not
a threat to one’s attitudes would lead them to attempt to bolster their sense of
moral conviction and existential meaning, let alone the extent to which attitude
strength may moderate this effect. Furthermore, no studies have examined the
extent to which experiencing moral conviction with regards to particular attitudes
contributes to one’s sense of existential meaning. The purpose of Study 1 was to
test whether or not threatening participants’ attitudes leads them to engage in
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compensatory processes by increasing moral conviction associated with a
threatened attitude, and to report greater levels of existential meaning and its four
related facets in response to attitude threat.
To test these ideas, in Study 1 participants’ attitudes were threatened or
upheld by presenting them with information that either contradicted or confirmed
their attitudes towards a topic. These passages were about the proliferation of
nuclear power (Study 1) and welfare reform (Study 2). These attitudes were
chosen based on a pretest, described below, because they had a wide range of
variability in moral conviction ratings, with a large portion of scores falling in the
middle of the distribution to allow for the possibility that participants change their
level of moral conviction. Attitude strength was measured before the
manipulation in the form of attitude support, extremity, certainty and importance.
To assess levels of meaning post-threat, participants were asked how much
meaning they feel in their lives, as well as how much they experience the four
facets of meaning described in the meaning maintenance model. Moral conviction
associated with the threatened attitudes was assessed post-threat to test whether or
not participants moralize their attitudes to a greater extent when their attitudes are
threatened.
Statement Hypotheses Study 1
Hypothesis 1: Participants whose strong attitudes are threatened will
report higher levels of meaning and its related facets compared to those whose
attitudes are upheld and compared to those with weak attitudes.
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Hypothesis 2: Participants whose strong attitudes are threatened will
report higher levels of moral conviction compared to those whose attitudes are
upheld and compared to those with weak attitudes.
Hypothesis 3: The extent to which people moralize attitudes will mediate
the relationship between attitude threat, meaningfulness in life, and facets of
meaning.
CHAPTER III: METHOD STUDY 1
Participants
192 undergraduates at a large Mid Western university participated for
partial course credit in an introductory psychology course. They were mostly
female (72%) and White (70%).
Materials and procedure
The study was administered using an online survey. I conducted a pretest
to find attitudes that were relatively uniformly supported and opposed in the
Study population. During the pretest, participants filled out demographic
measures and were presented with 39 attitude statements (see Appendix A), asked
how important the attitude is to them, how certain they are about it, and their level
of moral conviction about the attitude. Based on the pretest results, I chose two
issues to include in the manipulations: the proliferation of nuclear power (Study
1), and welfare reform (Study 2). I chose these attitudes because they had a large
amount of variability in moral conviction (see Figure 1 below).
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Figure 1
Pretest results for attitudes threatened in Studies 1 & 2
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Attitudinal Dimensions
Dimensions of attitude strength (i.e. importance, certainty, and extremity)
were measured during the study both before and after the experimental
manipulation and were derived from previous work on attitude strength and
morality (i.e. Skitka et al., 2005; Petty & Krosnick, 1995; see Appendix B for the
items, and Table 1 below for correlation matrices between the Study 1 items).
Participants responded to items assessing their feelings about the attitude at hand
in each study. These items assessed the extent to which participants were certain
about the attitude used in the manipulation (e.g. how certain or uncertain is your
position on this issue) and to which the attitude was important to them (e.g. how
important or unimportant is this attitude to you personally?). I used a categorical
attitude support measure to assess support for nuclear power pre-manipulation.
Participants also filled out a measure of the strength (i.e. a measure of extremity)
of their support or opposition to increased nuclear power.
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Table 1
Correlations between Studies 1 & 2 attitude strength measures.
Support
Extrem
Moral Conviction
Meaning
Self-esteem
Need to belong
Need for closure
Symbolic
Immortality
M
SD

1
-.05
.04
.07
.02
-.03

2

3

4

5

6

-.41***
.06
.05
-.10

-.14
-.04
-.02

-.54***
-.16*

--.31***

--

-.15*
.03

.09
.22**

-.04
.14

.02
.61***

.01
-.54***

1.77
.42

3.83
1.62

3.47
1.56

5.00
1.20

3.07
.50

Note:+p<.10,*p<.05,**p<.01 ***p<.001, all N

7

8

.17*
-.13

-.03

--

3.22
.60

4.00
.59

4.38
1.27
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Attitude Threat
I designed two passages “written by a university professor” to threaten or
uphold attitudes (See Appendix C). Participants were randomly assigned to one of
two conditions. In the first passage “Nuclear Energy: A Good Solution,”
participants read about the benefits of nuclear power. In the second passage
“Nuclear Energy: A Poor Solution” participants read about the drawbacks of
nuclear energy. The threat conditions are those in which participants who initially
supported nuclear energy read the passage stating that nuclear energy is a poor
solution, and participants who did not support nuclear energy read that it is a good
solution. The attitude-upholding conditions were those in which participants who
supported nuclear power read about its benefits, and participants who opposed
nuclear power read about its drawbacks.
Manipulation Check
To test whether or not the threat manipulation successfully threatened
participants’ attitudes, participants responded to five items on a one to seven scale
(1= not at all, 7 = very much) assessing the extent to which the passage they read
threatened their attitudes (i.e. “To what extent does the passage you just read
threaten your attitudes towards the proliferation of nuclear power”; see Appendix
D). The items formed a reliable scale ( = .86).
Moral Conviction
Moral conviction was measured with one item, post manipulation: “To
what extent are your beliefs about the proliferation of nuclear power a part of your
core moral values and convictions” on a seven-point scale (1 = not at al, 7 = very
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much; see Appendix E). Following this question, participants responded to the
same measures of attitude strength assessed pre manipulation (see Appendix E).
Existential Meaning
After the attitude threat manipulation, participants’ sense of existential
meaning was measured using the “Meaning in Life Scale” (Steger, Frasier, Oishi
& Kaler, 2006; See Appendix F;  = .86). After completing the meaning in life
scale, participants responded to scales assessing constructs that create meaning in
randomized order (i.e. self-esteem [Appendix G], need to belong [Appendix H],
need for closure [Appendix I], and symbolic immortality [Appendix J]). In line
with previous research (Von Tongeren & Greene, 2010) desire for certainty was
measured with a short version of the Need for Closure Scale (Houghton &
Grewal, 2000; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; See Appendix I;  = .73). Desire for
affiliation was measured with the Need to Belong Scale (Baumeister, 1986;
Leary, Kelly, Cottrell & Schreindorfer, 2005; see Appendix H;  = .80).
Participants rated their self-esteem using the Rosenberg Self Esteem scale (1965;
see Appendix G;  = .85). Symbolic immortality was assessed with a scale
designed for this study in which participants respond to four items (see Appendix
J;  = .89). The four facets of meaning were counterbalanced, but the meaning
and life scale always preceded them
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CHAPTER IV: STUDY 1 RESULTS
The Study 1 Hypotheses state that participants with strong attitudes whose
attitudes are threatened will exhibit greater meaning and its four facets
(Hypothesis 1) and moral conviction (Hypothesis 2). To test these hypotheses, I
ran models using three predictors; the essay condition variable, the dichotomous
support variable, and the continuous, centered extremity variable. I began by
computing models using dichotomous support, condition, and the centered
continuous extremity variable and all their possible interaction terms to predict,
meaning, all four facets of meaning, and moral conviction. Each dependent
variable was tested in a separate model. If the Study hypotheses are supported,
threatened participants should report greater meaning and moral conviction than
non-threatened participants. This effect should be greater amongst participants
who report higher levels of pre-manipulation attitude strength (i.e. extremity)
about their beliefs regarding nuclear power. In other words, we would expect a
two-way interaction between the passage participants read and their initial support
for nuclear power to be qualified by attitude strength. This method allows for a
specific test of the Study Hypotheses by allowing for an examination of the extent
to which not only threatening attitudes, but strong attitudes (as indexed by the
extremity measure), impacts meaning and moral conviction.
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To test Hypothesis 3, I used Precher and Hayes’ (2007) “Indirect” macro
for SPSS to assess whether or not significant indirect effects existed between any
hypothesized interaction terms and the meaning variables via moral conviction.
Manipulation Checks
I began with the manipulation check. I first regressed the threat scale on
the dichotomous support variable, which was always the support variable given
before the manipulation (-1 = oppose, 1 = support) the essay condition variable (1 = poor solution, 1 = good solution) and their interaction term.
A two way interaction between support and essay condition emerged
F(1,181) = 78.59, p<.001, p2 = .30 (see Figure 2). Simple effects tests
demonstrated that participants who supported nuclear power were more
threatened in the anti nuclear power essay condition than in the pro nuclear power
condition. The reverse was true of participants who opposed nuclear power,
suggesting the manipulation was succesful. No other simple effects emerged.
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Figure 2
Study 1 manipulation check with participant support and essay condition predicting moral conviction
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Analyses for Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 states that participants who read a passage that contradicts
their attitudes, especially participants high in extremity, will report increased
meaning in life and its related facets. I computed models testing Hypothesis 1 by
using the support, essay condition, and centered extremity variables, as well as all
their possible interactions terms to predict meaning and all of its facets. Only one
the three-way interaction pertaining to the Study Hypotheses emerged, with need
to belong as the dependent variable (see Table 2 below for the results of the
Hypothesis 1 multiple regression analyses, and Figure 3 below for a graph of the
need to belong results) F(1,175) = 5.09, p = .03, p2 = .08. Simple effects tests
revealed that amongst participants at low levels of extremity, the interaction
between support and condition was not significant F(1,175) = 1.25, p = .27.
Amongst participants at high levels of extremity, the two way interaction between
support and essay condition was significant F(1,175) = 4.13, p = .04, p2 = .02.
Simple effects tests demonstrated that participants who supported nuclear power
demonstrated marginally greater need to belong in the good solution condition
than in the poor solution condition F(1,175) = 3.08, p = .08, p2 = .02.
Participants who opposed nuclear power demonstrated no differences in need to
belong between conditions F(1,175) = 2.13, p =.15, p2 = .01. In the pro-reform
essay condition, no differences in need to belong emerged between participants
who supported or opposed nuclear power F(1,175) = 4.80, p =.49, p2 = .003, and
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in the anti-reform condition no effect of support emerged F(1,175) = .60, p =.44,
p2 = .004.
These results are partially consistent with the Study hypotheses. Although
the interaction between support for nuclear power and experimental condition was
expected to be stronger amongst people high in extremity (as it was), I also
expected that participants who read a passage opposing their viewpoints to report
increased need to belong, as belonging is a facet of meaning, and people should
attempt to increase meaning when strong attitudes are threatened. The apparent
(although non-significant) increase in need to belong amongst high extremity
supporters of nuclear power in the good solution condition compared to the poor
solution condition, and vice versa in the anti-nuclear power condition, was
unexpected.
ANALYSES FOR HYPOTHESIS 2
Hypotheses two states that participants who read a passage contradicting
their attitudes will demonstrate greater moral conviction, especially when they
feel strongly about their attitudes. To test Hypothesis 2 using the dichotomous
support and condition variables, and the extremity variable, I regressed moral
conviction on these three variables and all their possible interaction terms. Only a
main effect of extremity emerged demonstrating that higher levels of extremity
were related to higher levels of moral conviction (see Table 2).
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Table 2:
Multiple regression analyses for Study 1 hypotheses 1 & 2

Condition
Support
Extremity
Condition*support
Condition*extremity
Support*extremity
3-way

Moral conviction

Meaning

DF(1,179)
F
p2

p

DF(1,178)
F
p2

p

DF(1,174)
F
p2

.68
.04
23.25
2.65
1.47
.01
.81

.41
.84
.<.001
.11
.23
.94
.37

.29
.48
.39
.64
.11
<.001
.95

.59
.49
.54
.43
.74
1.00
.33

.03
.05
1.12
.13
1.29
.71
.52

.00
.00
.12
.02
.01
.00
.01

Self esteem

.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.01

.00
.00
.01
.00
.01
.00
.00

Need for Closure

Need to Belong

p

DF(1,163)
F
p2

p

DF(1,175)
F
p2

p

.86
.82
.29
.72
.26
.40
.47

1.46
4.61
1.26
.04
.52
.09
2.09

.23
.03
.26
.84
.47
.76
.15

.98
.57
.47
.45
.10
.57
5.09

.98
.57
.47
.45
.10
.57
.03

.01
.03
.01
.00
.00
.00
.01

.00
.00
.00
.00
.02
.00
.03

Symbolic
Immortality
DF(1,178)
F
p2
2.01
.00
8.47
1.58
.92
.71
.03

.01
.00
.05
.01
.01
.00
.00

p
.16
.99
.00
.21
.34
.40
.86
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Figure 2
Need to belong results for Study 1
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ANALYSES FOR HYPOTHESIS 3
The lack of the predicted three-way interactions on meaning, its facets,
and moral conviction precludes mediation.
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CHAPTER V: STUDY 1 DISCUSSION
Study 1 represents the first attempt to test whether or not people increase
their sense of meaning in life and moral conviction in response to attitude threat.
Although research has demonstrated that people with strong attitudes adhere more
strongly to them in response to a threat to their attitudes, no research has
specifically investigated whether or not people increase their sense of moral
conviction regarding threatened attitudes. In addition, previous research (i.e.
Festinger, 1956) implies that people may increasingly adhere to threatened
attitudes because they provide a strong sense of meaningfulness in life. Study 1
provides the first test of the idea that people increase their moral conviction, a
facet of attitude strength that lends attitudes a sense of absolute correctness
regarding threatened attitudes, in order to increase a sense of meaning after threat.
Meaning in Life
Overall, the Study 1 hypotheses stating that threatened participants would
increase their reports of meaning in life were not supported. Only a three-way
interaction between support, essay condition, and extremity emerged on need to
belong. However, the overall pattern of effects underlying this three-way
interaction was completely consistent with the study hypotheses, and suggested
that high extremity participants who read a passage counter to their views were
lower in need to belong (one of the four facets of meaning) than participants who
read an attitudinally-supportive passage. Although this effect was unexpected, it
may not be completely out of line with current research. Van Tongeren and
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colleagues (2010) found that people who were implicitly primed with
meaninglessness-related words were more likely to report higher levels of
symbolic immortality, need for closure, and self esteem, but decreased need to
belong. They attribute this finding to participants’ attempt to increase
meaningfulness by expressing higher levels of meaning on measures representing
established meaningfulness, and lower levels on constructs representing search for
meaningfulness. If need to belong represents a desire for meaning, as opposed to
actual meaning, participants in the current study may have been reluctant to
express this desire when their attitudes were threatened because it may not be a
method to increase meaning, but an indication that they do not feel meaningful.
Of course, it is also possible that these effects simply represent type 1 error. Out
of all the possible effects that could have occurred in Study 1, one of the few was
the three-way interaction on need to belong. This effect may simply have been
due to chance.
Another reason for the lack of meaning effects may be a lack of
connection between the attitude threat manipulation and the meaning measures.
Whereas the attitude threat manipulation and attitude strength measures pertained
specifically to participants’ beliefs about nuclear power, the meaning measures
were very broad in nature and examined participants’ overall level of meaning in
life. It may be the case that participants faced with support or threat to their
attitudes regarding a specific issue found no immediate connection between
threats to that specific attitude and broad measures of meaningfulness and its
facets. Simply because a person disagrees or agrees with a statement about a
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specific attitude may not affect their broad sense of meaningfulness in life,
especially if the attitude in question is not particularly important to them.
Consistent with this idea, the pre-manipulation importance rating was below the
midpoint of the scale (M = 3.69, SD = 1.43). It will be important in future studies
to assure that participants are invested enough in their attitudes that hearing that
their attitudes are incorrect truly constitutes a threat.
Moral Conviction
No moral conviction effects occurred in Study 1. Although the
manipulation resulted in the expected pattern of threat effects, participants did not
seem to be very threatened across the board by the manipulations. Participants
whose initial support or opposition to nuclear power was contradicted by the
manipulations, reported higher levels of threat than those who were not, overall
threat levels were not especially high. Even participants with strong attitudes who
read attitudinally-dissimilar passages reported levels of threat not much greater
than the midpoint of the scale. The Study hypotheses state that threat should lead
people to seek meaning and imbue attitudes with moral conviction. If participants
were not very threatened in general, they may not have felt a need to seek
meaning and imbue their threatened attitudes with moral conviction. Even if
participants reported that the passage contradicted their attitudes about nuclear
power, reading a passage about an attitude that people did not deem particularly
important may not have lead them to respond with an attempt to shore up their
attitudes. In future studies, it may be useful to select an attitude that participants
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feel is important to them personally, in addition to making sure that participants
exhibit a range of levels of moral conviction about the attitude to be threatened.
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CHAPTER VI: STUDY 2 INTRODUCTION
The results of Study 1 did not support the hypothesis that people
compensate when their attitudes are threatened by increasing their sense of moral
conviction and existential meaning. In Study 2, I further tested the hypothesis that
enhancing moral conviction after attitude threat increases one’s sense of
existential meaning and its four facets. Although participants in Study 1 did not
seem to have strong attitudes about nuclear power, and did not seem to be
particularly threatened by the manipulations, participants may have stronger
attitudes about other issues. In Study 2, I threatened participants’ attitudes
towards welfare reform. To the extent that their attitudes about welfare reform are
threatened, participants may be more likely to imbue them with a sense of moral
conviction, and strive for a sense of meaning in life.
Study 2 builds upon Study 1 in an important way. Study 1 did not provide
an explicit test of the hypothesis that moral conviction per se increases people’s
sense of meaning in life as well as its related facets. In Study 2, I attempted to
explicitly manipulate moral conviction by instructing participants to think about
why their attitudes about welfare reform (the attitude in question in Study 2), are a
part of their core moral values and convictions, to think about dental pain (a
commonly used control condition (see e.g. Arndt, Greenberg & Cook, 2002), or to
think about why the manipulation they read could be correct (in essence,
“dwelling” on the information they were given). I expected that this additional
moralization condition would moderate the results of the three-way interaction
predicted in Study 1. Specifically, reading a counter-attitudinal passage should
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increase moral conviction about the threatened attitude, meaningfulness in life
and its four facets. This should be especially the case amongst high extremity
participants, and that this effect will occur to a greater extent amongst participants
who explicitly moralize their attitudes compared to a control condition. I expected
participants who dwelled on the correctness of the information they were given to
score lower in moral conviction than participants who moralized them, or
participants in the control condition. In the dwelling condition, participants may
either dwell on a threat (if they disagree with the passage they read) or affirm
their beliefs (if they agree with the passage they read). Regardless, Participants
who were threatened by the essay manipulation to lose their opportunity to
moralize when dwelling on the threat passage, and participants who were affirmed
to feel less of a need to moralize an attitude that did not need to be protected from
threat. I expected increases in moral conviction to mediate increases in meaning
in life and its facets based on the moralization manipulation.
These predictions are in line with work on the process of fluid
compensation (Heine et al., 2006) as a tool to increase one’s sense of meaning
when sources of meaning are threatened. Because moral convictions are
experienced as objective and universal, people may cling to attitudes to a greater
extent when they are challenged (potentially to create a sense of meaning), and
exploratory evidence suggests that morality may create meaning. It seems likely
that morality may be a particularly effective attitudinal dimension for increasing
meaning when attitudes (especially strong ones) are under threat.
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To test whether or not attitude moralization increases meaning, I
threatened participants’ attitudes about welfare reform using the same
methodology implemented in Study 1. Following the threat manipulation, I
manipulated moral conviction by asking participants to write about how their
attitudes about welfare reform are a core part of their moral values and
convictions (the moralization condition), dental pain (a neutral or control
condition), or to “dwell” on the threat manipulation, and discuss how it is correct
in its assertions. To the extent to which participants feel increased meaning in
response to an intentional moralization of their threatened attitudes in comparison
to a neutral, or aversive condition in which they are asked to dwell on threats, it
may be inferred that attitude moralization creates meaning in response to threat.
Study 2 was also designed to test the extent to which threatened
participants are willing to support morally mandated behaviors (i.e. vigilante
justice and increased social distance from attitude violators) especially to the
extent that their attitudes are strong and moralized. When attitudes (which may
create meaning) are threatened, participants may be especially likely to want to
defend them by punishing attitude violators, even if punishment violates social
norms. I expected that threatened participants high in extremity about their beliefs
about welfare reform, would desire greater social distance from attitude violators,
believe that procedures violating their attitudes are unfair, and be more likely to
support vigilante justice towards attitude violators compared to non-threatened
participants. I expected these effects to be moderated by the moralization
manipulation such that threatened participants will be more likely to exhibit the
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abovementioned responses to a greater extent in the moralization condition
compared to the control condition, and expected that no increases in these
responses amongst participants who dwell on a threat to their attitudes.
Statement of Hypotheses Study 2
Hypothesis 1: Threatened participants with strong attitudes in the
moralization condition will experience more meaning and its related facets than
participants in a control condition and participants who dwell on a threat (who
will report the lowest levels of meaning). This overall pattern will hold for
threatened participants lower in attitude strength, although this will occur to a
lesser extent than amongst high attitude strength participants
Hypothesis 2: Threatened participants (compared to non-threatened
participants) with strong attitudes in the moralization condition will experience
their attitudes as more moral than participants in a control condition and
participants who dwell on a threat. This overall pattern will hold for threatened
participants lower in attitude strength, although their levels of moral conviction
will be lower than high strength participants.
Hypothesis 3: Participants in the attitude threat condition who are high in
attitude strength will be more likely to engage in “morally mandated” behaviors to
a greater extent than people low in attitude strength. Non-threatened participants
will not exhibit a desire for morally mandated behaviors towards attitude
violators. Threatened participants who are asked to moralize their attitudes will
engage in greater moral mandate effects compared to participants in the dental
pain condition, followed by the dwelling condition.
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Hypothesis 4: Moral conviction associated with the threatened attitude and
moralization condition will mediate the relationship between attitude threat and
meaning.
Hypothesis 5: Moral conviction associated with the threatened attitude and
moralization condition will mediate the relationship between attitude threat and
moral mandates.
CHAPTER VII METHOD STUDY 2
Participants
1331 students at a large Mid-western university participated for partial course
credit in their introductory psychology courses. They were mostly female (63%)
and White (72%).
Materials and Procedure
Study 2 was administered using an online survey. Based on the pretest, I
chose to focus on participants’ attitudes towards welfare reform.
Attitudinal Dimensions
First, participants rated their support for welfare reform, the strength of
their attitudes about welfare reform, the importance of welfare reform to them
personally, and how certain they were about their attitudes about welfare reform
(See Appendix B).
Originally, 240 participants completed the survey. Participants were
removed for not following the directions in the moralization condition. They
did not complete the moralization manipulation at all, failed to complete the
manipulation or explicitly stated that welfare reform is not connected to
their moral convictions in the moralization condition, or wrote about how
the essay was incorrect in the dwelling condition. I did not include
participants who opposed welfare reform because they were too few in
number to provide adequate power for the required analyses (N= 46).
1
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Attitude Threat
I designed two passages stating that welfare reform is a good or poor
solution to threaten participants (see footnote 1). The manipulations are located in
Appendix K. As in Study 1, I created two passages. The pro-welfare reform
passage, provided participants with a description of how welfare is a flawed
system, which is often exploited by the undeserving. The anti-welfare reform
passage described welfare as a system that benefits the poor, and welfare reform
as an attempt to unjustly cut public spending (see Appendix K for the
manipulation).
Morality Manipulation
To explicitly test whether or not an increase in moral conviction leads to
an increased sense of meaning, participants completed a morality manipulation in
which they wrote about the extent to which their position on the attitude described
in the above manipulation is a part of their core moral beliefs and convictions,
write about all the possible reasons the passage they read is correct or wrote about
dental pain (See Appendix L).
Manipulation Check
To assess whether or the manipulation was effective in increasing
participants’ sense of moral conviction regarding welfare reform, participants
responded to the same questions assessing the extent to which participants viewed
the attitude in question as a core part of their moral beliefs and convictions used
in Study 1 (see Appendix B). Participants also responded to the same five items
used to measure attitude threat in Study 1 (see Appendix D;  = .88).
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Existential Meaning
After the manipulation checks, participants responded to the same scales
to assess meaning in life and its related constructs used in Study 1 (see
Appendices F,G, H, I & J). All scales demonstrated adequate reliability: meaning
in life  = .92, self-esteem  = .91, need to belong  = .84, symbolic immortality
 = .85, need for closure  = .77. As in Study 1, participants responded to the
Meaning in Life Scale first, and then responded to the scales assessing the four
sources of meaning in counterbalanced order.
Moral Mandates
To assess the extent to which participants adhere to moral mandates by
engaging in aggressive behavior towards attitude violators. I asked participants
about the extent to which politicians who support welfare reform should be
punished for their beliefs even if it requires illegal action (see Appendix O;  =
.93). I also included items measuring the extent to which participants preferred
social distance from people who violate their attitudes (Byrnes and Kiger; 1988;
Crandall, 1981; Skitka, Bauman & Sargis, 2005; see Appendix M;  = .93). Items
were included to assess the extent to which participants see social institutions that
disagree with their attitudes as unfair and illegitimate (Skitka, 2002; see Appendix
N;  = .85). After completing these measures, participants provided basic
demographic information (see Appendix P). Correlations between all the Study 2
variables are reported in Table 4.
CHAPTER VIII: STUDY 2 RESULTS
Manipulation Check
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To test if the attitude threat passages were effective in inducing a sense of
threat, I regressed the threat scale on the essay condition variable. No effect
emerged F(1,131) = .03, p = .87.
To test if the moralization condition effectively altered participants’ moral
conviction, I regressed the moral conviction variable on the moralization
condition variable. No main effect emerged F(1,131) = .21, p = .65, p2 = .002,
suggesting the moralization condition was not effective in altering participants’
moral convictions.
To test the first Study 2 hypotheses, I first analyzed whether or not the
essay condition variable, the moralization condition variable, the centered
extremity variable, and all their possible interaction terms predicted meaning and
all of its facets, as well as moral conviction, in separate models. The moralization
condition variable was a three level variable, and all Fs and significance tests
including this variable (including interaction terms including the moralization
variable) are based on an omnibus F value. When testing underlying simple
effects at different levels of the moralization variable, I computed two polynomial
orthogonal contrast codes to test differences between the three conditions. These
variables were coded using a linear code (1 = moralization condition, 0 = dental
pain, -1 = dwelling) and a quadratic code (-1 = moralization, 2 = dental pain, -1 =
dwelling). The linear code tests the difference between the moralization condition
and the dwelling condition, and the quadratic code tests the difference between
the dental pain condition and the other two conditions.
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Table 3
Correlations between Study 2 variables

ExtremityT1
Moral
Conviction
Meaning
Self-esteem
Need to belong

1
2
-.52*** --

3

.13
.07
.01

-.56*** --.21* -.27

.27**
.15+
-.02

Need for
.20*
.23** .05
closure
Symbolic
.02*
.14
.55***
immortality
Social distance .03
-.14
.12
Procedural
.25** .07
.08
Fairness
Support for
-.24** -.11
.04
Vigilantism
M
4.05
4.18
3.69
SD
1.60
1.33
.88
Note:+p<.10,*p<.05,**p<.01 ***p<.001,

4

-.08

5

6

7

8

9

--

10

-.19*

--

.51*** -.14

.10

--

.11
.08

.06
.-.01

-.12
.11

.26**
.17*

-.25**

-.12

.13

.02

.12

-.13

3.76
.69

3.26
.64

4.02
.64

3.42
.78

4.09
1.13

-.28***
4.23
2.71
1.19
1.31
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Analyses for Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 states that participants who read a passage contradicting their
attitudes would report more meaning in life and its related facets than participants
who read a passage confirming their attitudes. This should be especially true
among participants who affirm their moral convictions compared to the control
(dental pain), and dwelling conditions. Overall, these results should be stronger
for participants with higher attitude extremity (strength) regarding welfare reform.
Participants who dwell on a passage opposing their attitudes should show lower
levels of moral conviction than participants who affirm their moral convictions,
and participants in the control condition.
I began the analyses for Hypothesis 1 by entering the moralization
condition variable, the dichotomous essay condition variable, the centered
extremity variable, and all possible interaction terms between them predicting
meaning and its four facets, in five separate multiple regression models (See
Table 2 for all multiple regression results from Hypotheses 1).
With meaning in life self esteem, and symbolic immortality as dependent
variables, no effects emerged.
With Need for Closure as the dependent variable, a main effect of
extremity emerged suggesting that extremity was related to higher need for
closure F(1,116) = 6.01, b = .08, SE = .04, p = .02, p2 = .05. With need to belong
as the dependent variable, a marginal main effect of morality condition F(1,118) =
2.35, p = .10, p2 = .04, was qualified by a marginal interaction with extremity
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F(1,116) = 2.52, p = .09, p2 = .04 (see Figure 3). Simple effects tests
demonstrated that, amongst participants low in extremity, those in the
moralization condition were lower in need to belong than those in the dwelling
condition F(1,116) = 4.91, p = .03, p2 = .04, but no differences emerged between
participants in the dental pain condition compared to the other two conditions
F(1,116)<.001, p = 1.00, p2 <.001. Amongst participants high in extremity,
participants in the moralization condition were marginally lower in need to belong
than those in the dwelling condition F(1,116) = 3.00, p = .08, p2 = .03, but no
differences emerged between the dental pain condition and the other two
conditions F(1,116) = 1.26, p = .26, p2 = .01.
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Table 4
Multiple regression analyses Study 2 hypotheses 1 &2
Moral conviction

Meaning

Self esteem

Need for Closure

Need to Belong

Symbolic Immortality

F

p

p2

F

p

p2

F

p

p2

F

p

p2

F

p

p2

F

p

p2

Welfare Condition
Moral Condition

.50
.51

.48
.60

.004
.01

.27
.43

.60
.65

.002
.01

.34
.37

.56
.69

.003
.01

.31
1.65

.58
.20

.003
.03

.15
2.35

.70
.10

.001
.04

.14
1.04

.71
.36

.001
.02

Extremity
Welfare
ConditionXMoral
Condition
Welfare
ConditionXExtremity
Moral
ConditionXExtremity
Moral
ConditionXWelfare
ConditionXExtremity

45.52
1.13

<.001
.33

.28
.02

1.74
.22

.19
.81

.01
.004

.53
.23

.47
.80

.004
.004

6.01
.96

.02
.38

.05
.02

.02
1.72

.88
.18

<.001
.03

.09
.75

.76
.48

.001
.01

.25

.62

.02

.27

.61

.002

1.34

.25

.01

.10

.75

.001

.67

.41

.01

.24

.63

.002

.56

.67

.01

.09

.92

.001

.82

.44

.01

1.21

.30

.02

2.52

.09

.04

.35

.70

.01

.47

.62

.01

.90

.41

.02

.19

.83

.003

.39

.68

.01

.43

.65

.01

.38

.69

.01
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Figure 3: Need to Belong Results, Study 2
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Analyses for Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that participants who read a passage contradicting their
attitudes will become more morally convicted about their attitudes than
participants who read a passage confirming their attitudes. This should be
especially true amongst participants who affirm their moral convictions compared
to the control (dental pain) condition, followed by participants who dwell on a
passage opposing their attitudes. Overall, these results should be stronger for
participants with higher attitude extremity regarding welfare reform.
I began the test of Hypothesis 2 by regressing moral conviction on the
essay condition variable, the moralization condition variable, the extremity
variable, and all their possible interactions (see Table 4). Only a main effect of
extremity emerged F(1,120) = 45.52, b =.44 SE = .07, p <.001 p2 = .28,
indicating that participants who had strong beliefs about welfare reform were
more likely to have a sense of moral conviction regarding welfare reform.
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Analyses for Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 states that participants who read a passage contradicting their
attitudes will report greater desire for social distance from people opposing their
attitudes, exhibit fewer beliefs that legal procedures opposing their attitudes are
fair, and show greater support for vigilantism to protect their attitudes than
participants who read a passage confirming their attitudes. This should be
especially true among participants who affirm their moral convictions compared
to the control (dental pain) condition, followed by participants who dwell on a
passage opposing their attitudes. Overall, these results should be stronger for
participants with higher attitude extremity (strength) regarding welfare reform.
To test this hypothesis, I regressed the social distance, procedural fairness,
and vigilantism variables on the essay condition variable, the moralization
condition variable, the centered extremity variable, and all their possible
interaction terms in separate models (see Table 5 for the results of these analyses).
Only an main effect of extremity emerged on vigilantism, suggesting greater
extremity was associated with decreased support for vigilantism F(1,119) = 8.07,
p =.01, b = -.21, SE = .07, p2 = .06.
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Table 5
Results for Hypothesis 3 Study 2

Social Distance
F
p
Welfare Condition
Moral Condition
Extremity
Welfare ConditionXMoral
Condition
Welfare
ConditionXExtremity
Moral
ConditionXExtremity
Moral ConditionXWelfare
ConditionXExtremity

2

2

.01
1.01
8.07
.08

.93
.37
.01
.78

.001

.70

.50

.01

.44

.01

1.51

.23

.03

.59

.01

1.98

.14

.03

.86
.12
.004
.99

.02 .03

.97

.76

.01 .82

.64

.01 .52

.93
.91
.66
.89

1.32

.27

.28
.45

.03
2.14
8.54
<.001

Vigilantism
F
p

p2
00
.02
.06
.001

p
<.001
.04
.07
<.001

.01
.10
.20
.02

p
<.001
.002
.002
<.001

Procedural Fairness
F
p
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Analyses for Hypothesis 4
The Hypothesis 4 analyses are not possible because of the lack of
predicted effects on moral conviction, meaning, and its facets.
Analyses for Hypothesis 5
The Hypothesis 5 analyses are not possible because of the lack of
predicted effects on moral conviction and morally mandated behaviors.
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CHAPTER IX STUDY 2 DISCUSSION
Study 2 attempted to test the Study 1 hypotheses, and to provide a more
explicit test of the hypothesis stating that an increase in moral conviction
associated with attitude threat aids people to boost their sense of meaning in life.
To the extent that participants explicitly moralize their attitudes in response to
threat, they should increase their sense of meaningfulness in life. If participants
are lead to consider the merits of a counter attitudinal passage, it may block their
ability to moralize their attitudes and create a sense of subsequent meaningfulness
in life.
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation checks suggested that the essay conditions were
ineffective in altering participants’ sense of attitude threat. The moralization
manipulation was ineffective in altering participants’ sense of moral conviction.
Overall, these results demonstrate that pattern of threat was as expected, but not
enough to induce a strong sense of threat in participants, and that participants did
not moralize their attitudes based on the moralization manipulation.
In future studies, it will be important to make sure that a threatened attitude
is important to participants and that they feel strongly about it, as this may
increase the likelihood that they will be threatened by counter-attitudinal
passages. This may be also be accomplished by making sure that attitudes are well
understood to participants. In the case of Study 2, participants may not have had a
clear idea of what exactly constituted welfare reform.
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It is also important that future studies find a more effective way to
increase participants’ moral convictions regarding a particular attitude. Instead of
asking participants to write about why their attitudes are a core part of their moral
values and convictions, it might be helpful to ask them to write about how an
attitude represents absolute right or wrong. If participants did not associate
morality with absolute right or wrong specifically, the manipulation may not have
been geared towards manipulating moral conviction and all it entails per se
(specifically its absolute nature), as moral conviction is a person’s belief that an
attitude is absolutely correct or incorrect (Skitka, 2010). It is also possible that
moral conviction simply cannot be manipulated in the fashion attempted here
because of the fact that it represents ones belief that an attitude is an immutable
truth. If participants did in fact understand moral conviction to represent the
absolute truth, it may not be possible to alter people’s moral convictions simply
by asking them to moralize or dwell on information. Moral convictions may
simply be too ingrained to change in this manner.
Meaningfulness in life
As in the first study, no reliable differences emerged with meaning in life
and its four facets as dependent variables. Only a two-way interaction was present
between extremity and moralization condition on need to belong. The pattern of
this interaction suggested that participants in the moralization condition were less
likely to endorse the need to belong than participants in the dwelling condition
overall. This may have occurred if participants feel that a desire to belong is
indicative of a lack of belonging (see e.g. Van Tongeren & Green, 2010). If
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participants felt more meaningful after moralizing their attitudes, feeling
increased moral conviction may have increased a sense of overall belonging, and
hence, decreased need to belong.
Moralization
No moral conviction effects emerged. This is not surprising because
participants did not seem to be threatened by the attitude threat manipulation, and
the moralization manipulation was unsuccessful.
Moral Mandates
No moral mandate effects occurred. This is also unsurprising because of the
failed manipulations.
CHAPTER X: CONCLUSION
The present Studies represent the first attempt to test the idea that people
increase their sense of moral conviction in response to attitude threats in an
attempt to bolster a sense of meaning. Overall, neither study found support for
this idea. There may be several reasons why this occurred. First, the issues
discussed in the manipulations may have been unimportant (in the case of Study
1) or ambiguous (Study 2) to the participants. In both studies, the threat patterns
that emerged were expected, but participants did not seem to be very threatened
overall in either study. This may have precluded the possibility of finding threat
effects. Third, the measures of meaning in life may have been too broad and
disconnected from the attitudes that were manipulated to be affected by the
manipulations.
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Based on the effects that did emerge in Studies 1 and , it does appear that
threatening attitudes may impact meaning in life at times, but the results presented
here do not necessarily match the predictions put forth in the study hypotheses. In
Study 1, threatening participants’ attitudes lead them to endorse a need to belong
to a lesser extent than upholding their attitudes, potentially because a greater need
to belong may be indicative of a decreased sense of meaning in life. In Study 2,
the need to belong results may have emerged if moralizing an attitude imbued
participants with a sense of meaning in life, decreasing their need to belong.
These results may also represent type 1 error.
The lack of increased moral conviction and morally mandated behaviors
(in Study 2) may have occurred because participants were not adequately
threatened by the manipulations. The study hypotheses state threat will increase
moral conviction. If no threat was present, there is no reason that moral
conviction would increase.
Although the results of both Studies were ambiguous with regard to the
meaningfulness in life measures, participants seemed mainly to be affected at
lower levels of extremity, and low extremity participants seemed to experience
less need to belong when they moralized their attitudes compared to dwelling on
the passage. People who already feel strongly about something may not be as
likely to change their attitudes about it, and the meaning measures did not seem to
move in tandem with the moral conviction measures amongst high extremity
participants. To the extent that participants did not feel strongly about their
attitudes, they may have been more willing (although not significantly) to
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moralize them when asked to do so, and this moralization may have resulted in
this increase
Future Research
In light of the results of the present studies, future research should be
conducted to clarify the relationship between attitude threat, moral conviction,
and meaningfulness in life. Several steps may be taken to increase the chances
that this research will be effective. First, it is important to assure that the attitudes
under threat are indeed meaningful to a large number of participants under study,
and that they have a good understanding of the issue at hand. Of course, it is also
possible that attitude threat did not lead to increased moral conviction and
meaningfulness in any consistent way because people do not moralize their
attitudes and create meaning in response to threat. The manipulation checks show
that the expected threat patterns emerged based on the essay condition and
participant support, especially in Study 1. It may simply be the case that the
processes proposed here in terms of threat, moral conviction, and meaning, simply
do not exist.
Second, it may help to assure that all measures of meaningfulness in life
are tailored specifically to the issue addressed in the experimental manipulations.
If participants do not make an explicit connection between the attitude under
threat, and how it may contribute to meaning in life, it may be very difficult to
detect a relationship between moral conviction regarding a specific attitude and its
contribution to one’s sense of meaningfulness in life. It would still be possible to
capture the inherent abstractness of meaningfulness while measuring it in relation
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to a specific attitude. Participants could be asked the extent to which a specific
attitude they hold allows them to feel a sense of meaningfulness, and the
constructs that create it.
Third, future research should make sure that pretests explicitly measure
the extent to which participants feel strongly about an attitude, and assure that the
manipulations describe attitudes in such a way that they accurately represent
threats or affirmations of peoples’ attitudes. For example, if participants in Study
2 rated their attitudes about welfare reform and had a notion of the nature of
welfare reform that was different than the welfare reform policies described in the
manipulation, it may have been difficult to create sets of conditions that uniformly
opposed or upheld participants’ attitudes about welfare reform. It is important to
assure that most participants have the same notion of what exactly constitutes the
policies under threat.
Although the moralization results were not consistent with the Study
hypotheses, the presence of moral conviction effects based on the experimental
manipulations suggest that the manipulations had some effect on moral
conviction, but generally failed to find interpretable meaningfulness effects,
potentially because of the broad nature of the meaningfulness measures. In future
studies, researchers might consider examining how factors such as construal level
(Trope &Liberman, 2003) affect the extent to which people are willing to
moralize attitudes under threat and associate these attitudes with a sense of
meaningfulness in life. Current research (Conway & Peetz, 2012) demonstrates
that construal level moderates the extent to which memories of committing an
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immoral act lead to behavioral consistency, or an attempt to compensate by
behaving differently. Concrete construal, operationalized as remembering an
immoral act committed recently, lead to behavior change, whereas abstract
construal, operationalized as remembering an immoral act committed in the
distant past, leads to behavioral consistency.
People who are in a state of concrete construal, and are focused
specifically on the attitude under threat, they may increase their moral conviction
regarding the specific attitude in question, and associate it with their sense of
meaningfulness in life (especially if the attitude is specifically implicated in
meaning). To the extent that people are in a broad state of construal, threatening a
specific attitude may lead participants to moralize their attitudes in general, and
associate a wider variety of attitudes associated with meaningfulness in life.
Although the current research did not take these factors into account, future
research may explore the way in which specific vs. concrete threats affect specific
attitudes.
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Appendix A
Pretest Items
Please answer the questions that follow using the scales provided.
Universal health care (example)
Do you support or oppose universal healthcare?
Totally oppose 1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7 Totally support
How certain is your position on this issue?
Totally uncertain 1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7 Totally certain
How important or unimportant is this issue to you?
Totally unimportant 1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7 Totally important
To what extent are your feelings about universal healthcare a reflection of your core moral values
and convictions?
Not at all 1----------2----------3----------4----------5----------6----------7 Very much

List of issues:
Universal healthcare
Permanent closure of all abortion clinics
A democratic candidate for U.S. president
Government surveillance of private internet browsing
HIV/AIDs education in the schools
Embryonic stem-cell research
A declaration of war against Iran
Government regulation of religious congregation
Same-sex marriage Prayer in public school
Policies designed to end income disparity
Condom distribution in public high schools
A constitutional amendment outlawing the death penalty
Marijuana for approved medical purposes
A constitutional amendment outlawing same-sex marriage
Immediate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq
Death penalty for convicted murderers
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North Korea’s right to have a nuclear weapons program
Continuing the war on drugs
Enforcing food and drug safety standards
Government enforcement of disability rights
Decreased gun control
Funding for genetic engineering
The increased availability of pornography
Increased emphasis on recycling and conservation
Prison reform and prisoner rights
Teacher’s promotions based on student’s test scores
An increase in labor unions’ power
Comprehensive sex education in public schools
Additional subsidies for organic farming
Physician-assisted suicide
War on terror
Welfare reform
Tight restrictions on immigration
Campaign finance reform
Decreased spending on federal housing
The availability of divorce
The expansion of nuclear power
Offshore oil drilling
A comprehensive exam requirement for graduation
Appendix B
Attitude Strength Measures Pre Manipulation
Directions: The following questions assess your feelings about (INSERT
ATTITUDE). Please respond to the following scales about you feelings about this
attitude using the scales provided below.

Do you generally support or oppose (INSERT
ATTITUDE)
How important or unimportant is this issue to you?

How certain or uncertain is your position on this
issue?

How Strongly do you feel about your support or
opposition to this issue?

1
Support

2
Oppose

1-----2------3------4------5------6-------7
Totally
Totally
Unimportant
Important
1------2------3------4------5------6------7
Totally
Totally
Uncertain
Certain
1------2------3------4------5------6------7
Not Strongly
As Strongly

At all

As Possible
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Appendix C
Threat Manipulation for Study 1
Study 1 Pro Nuclear Energy Manipulation:
DIRECTIONS: Please read the following article, written by a university professor, about the
expansion of nuclear power. Please read carefully, you will be asked questions about this
article later.
Nuclear Energy: A Good Solution
As the nation’s population grows and there is increased demand for more electrical
power, people will need to find more efficient ways of generating electricity. Fusion (also known
as nuclear power, a method of converting nuclear energy into electricity) has been proposed as a
long-term way to produce electrical energy.
According to Martin Smith, a consultant for the National Energy Commission, “Nuclear
power is the best solution to the current energy problems we face in the United States. Nuclear
power is an inexpensive power source because nuclear power is the most concentrated source of
power. Although the initial cost of building a nuclear power plant is high, once the plant is
established, the power generated by the plant will more than pay for the initial cost and
maintenance of the plant.”
According to many experts, nuclear power is also considered one of the safest and most
environmentally-friendly sources of energy. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency
reports that nuclear power is non-polluting and the by-products of nuclear power can be easily
contained and disposed of in a manner that will not cause harm to people or the environment.
Accidents at nuclear power plants are exceedingly rare, especially compared to other energy
producing industries. This makes nuclear power significantly safer than coal and petroleum based
energy sources, which pollute the air and water with massive amounts of toxic byproducts.
Because of this, the United States would have fewer environmental and health problems with
nuclear energy, compared to the risks caused by coal and petroleum products.
Nuclear power is also extremely efficient. The electricity produced in nuclear power
plants can be immediately connected to existing power supplies, and distributed to the population.
Traditional energy sources require the construction of additional infrastructure and can be costly
and dangerous to distribute.
Overall, nuclear power is a cheap, safe, and efficient source of energy. The government
of the United States (as well as others) would benefit from adopting it as a source of power in the
future.
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Study 1 Anti-Nuclear Energy Manipulation:
DIRECTIONS: Please read the following article, written by a university professor, about the
expansion of nuclear power. Please read carefully, you will be asked questions about this
article later.
Nuclear Energy: A Poor Solution
As the nation’s population grows and there is increased demand for more electrical
power, people will need to find more efficient ways of generating electricity. Fusion (also known
as nuclear power, a method of converting nuclear energy into electricity) has been proposed as a
long-term way to produce electrical energy.
According to Martin Smith, a consultant for the National Energy Commission, “Nuclear
power is the worst solution to the current energy problems we face in the United States. Nuclear
power is an expensive power source because nuclear power is not a concentrated source of power.
The initial cost of building a power plant is high, and once the plant is established, the power
generated by the plant is not enough to cover the initial cost and maintenance of the plant”.
According to many experts, nuclear power is also considered one of the most dangerous
and environmentally hazardous sources of energy. For example, the Environmental Protection
Agency reports that nuclear power is highly polluting and the by-products of nuclear power are
difficult to contain and dispose of in a manner that will not cause harm to people or the
environment. Although rare, accidents at nuclear power plants are extremely dangerous and can
have devastating effects on surrounding populations compared to accidents in other energy
producing industries, making the risks outweigh the benefits. This makes nuclear power
significantly more dangerous than coal and petroleum based energy sources, which do not produce
byproducts that can last thousands of years. Because of this, the United States would have many
more problems safely dealing with the byproducts of nuclear energy, even compared to the risks
caused by coal and petroleum products.
Nuclear power is also extremely inefficient. The electricity produced in nuclear power
plants cannot be immediately connected to existing power supplies, and distributed to the
population. Switching to nuclear energy would also require completely overhauling our energy
infrastructure, which will be extremely costly.
Overall, nuclear power is an expensive, unsafe, and inefficient source of energy. The
government of the United States (as well as others) would be making a mistake to adopt it as a
source of power in the future.
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Appendix
Manipulation Check
Directions: Please respond to the questions below on the scales provided

1-----2------3------4------5------6-------7
Not
Very
At All
Much

To what extent does the passage you just
read contradict your attitudes towards
the expansion of nuclear power?

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

I feel like the passage I just read goes
against my attitudes towards the
expansion of nuclear power.

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7
I am in agreement with the passage I just
read.(R)
1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7
I disagree with the passage I have just
read.
Note: (R) = reverse coded item
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Appendix E
Attitude Strength Post Manipulation
Directions: Now that you have read a passage about (INSERT ISSUE) we would
like you to re-rate your feelings about (INSERT ISSUE) Please answer the
following question on the scale provided
To what extent are your feelings about
(INSERT ISSUE) a core part of your core
moral values and convictions?
Do you generally support or oppose (INSERT
ATTITUDE)
How important or unimportant is this issue to
you?
How certain or uncertain is your position on
this issue?

How strongly do you feel about your support
or opposition to this issue?

1-----2------3------4------5------6-------7
Not
Very
At All
Much
1
Support

2
Oppose

1-----2------3------4------5------6-------7
Totally
Totally
Unimportant
Important
1------2------3------4------5------6------7
Totally
Totally
Uncertain
Certain
1-----2------3------4------5------6-------7
Not Strongly
As Strongly
at all
as possible
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Appendix F
Meaning in Life Scale
Directions: Please answer the following questions on the scales provided.

Absolutely Mostly
Untrue
Untrue
1
2

Somewhat
Untrue
3

Can’t Say
True or False
4

Somewhat
True
5

Mostly
True
6

Absolutely
True
7

I understand my life’s meaning.

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

My life has a clear sense of purpose.

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

I have a good sense of what makes my life
meaningful.

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

My life has no clear purpose. (R)

1-------2-------3-------4-------5-------6-------7

Note: (R) = reverse coded item
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Appendix G
Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale
Directions: Please respond to the questions below on the scales provided.
(SA= Strongly Agree, A=Agree, D=Disagree SD=Strongly Disagree)
On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
SA
A
D
SD
At times, I think I am no good at all. (R)
I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
I am able to do things as well as most other
people.

SA
SA
SA

A
A
A

D
D
D

SD
SD
SD

I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
(R)
I certainly feel useless at times. (R)
I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on
an equal plane with others.

SA

A

D

SD

SA
SA

A
A

D
D

SD
SD

SA

A

D

SD

SA

A

D

SD

SA

A

D

SD

I wish I could have more respect for
myself.(R)
All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a
failure.(R)
I take a positive attitude toward myself.
Note: (R) = reverse coded item
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Appendix H
Need to Belong Scale
Directions: For each of the statements below, indicate the degree to which
you agree or disagree with the statement by writing a number in the space
beside the question using the scale below.
Note: (R) = reverse coded item
1 = Strongly disagree
2 = Moderately disagree
3 = Neither agree nor disagree
4 = Moderately agree
5 = Strongly agree

If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let
it bother me.(R)
I try hard not to do things that will make other
people avoid or reject me.
I seldom worry about whether other people care
about me.(R)
I need to feel that there are people I can turn to in
times of need.
I want other people to accept me.
I do not like being alone.
Being apart from my friends for long periods of
time does not bother me. (R)
I have a strong need to belong.
It bothers me a great deal when I am not included
in other people's plans.
My feelings are easily hurt when I feel that others
do not accept me.

1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
1--------2--------3--------4--------5
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Appendix I
NFC Scale
Directions: Read each of the following statements and decide how much you
would agree or disagree with each according to your attitudes, beliefs and
experiences. Please respond according to the scale provided by circling the best
answer.

1-----------2-----------3----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Strongly
Neutral
Strongly
Disagree
or Uncertain
Agree
Even after I have made up my mind about something, I
am always eager to consider a different opinion. (R)
When considering most conflict situations, I usually see
how much both sides could be right. (R)
When thinking about a problem, I consider as many
different opinions on the issue as possible. (R)
I always see many possible solutions to problems I face.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I don’t like to be with people who are capable of
unexpected actions.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know
what to expect from them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a situation without
knowing what might happen. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I dislike it when a person’s statement could mean many
different things.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel uncomfortable when someone’s meaning or
intentions are unclear to me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason
why an event occurred in my life.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very
upset.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

(R)
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to
enjoy my life.
I enjoy having a clear structured mode of life.
I like to have a place for everything and everything in its
place.
I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my
temperament.
I dislike unpredictable situations.
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I tend to put off important decisions until the last
moment. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I usually make important decisions quickly and
confidently.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I would describe myself as indecisive. (R)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Note: (R) = reverse coded item

Appendix J
Symbolic Immortality Scale
Directions: Please respond to the questions that follow on the scales provided
1-----------2-----------3----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Strongly
Neutral
Strongly
Disagree
or Uncertain
Agree
I know that my life accomplishments will live on
when I die
When I die, I will know I have made the world a
better place
I do not think that my accomplishments will live
on after my death
I can die knowing that I will be remembered for
what I have done in my lifetime.
Note: (R) = reverse coded item

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Appendix K
Study 2 Pro Welfare Reform Manipulation
DIRECTIONS: Please read the following article, written by a university professor, about welfare
reform. Please read carefully, you will be asked questions about this article later.
Welfare Reform: A Good Solution
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, the most
comprehensive overhaul of the welfare system, was signed into law. This law reduced funding for
the 60-year-old safety net, leaving millions of poor families with fewer resources. The new system
has positively impacted the poor, as well as the nation, in many ways: far fewer working families
receive government assistance to cover child-care costs, which has lead many to enter the work
force in order to care for their families. The net result is an increase in the percentage of poorer
people earning paychecks, bringing the proportion of those working up to 83 percent. Because of
the drop in the number of those working, 71 percent of these lower-income families are no longer
in desperate need of assistance, and the national economy has been improved by the increase of
people in the workforce.
When people talk about welfare reform, they are trying to improve the lives of people as
service users, citizens and claimants, and to improve these services by removing inefficiencies and
wasteful public spending. The high costs of welfare programs result in higher taxes, which can
stifle economic activity and lead to fewer jobs, higher rates of unemployment, and increased need
for government aid.
The welfare system was also in desperate need of reform due to rampant exploitation,
fraud and abuse. According to the Pew Research Foundation,at least 30 percent of welfare claims
were likely fraudulent. Welfare abuse is the intentional exploitation of welfare services and can
have many manifestations. For instance, a woman may deliberately have another child in order to
receive more welfare funds. In addition, people who are otherwise able-bodied may make no effort
to obtain employment in order to continue to receive welfare benefits.
A proactive and conscientious approach to welfare reform is able to meet goals to
decrease bureaucratic costs and waste, provide more streamlined services, and promote greater
social responsibility. The latter may be an unstated intention but it does a lot for the social order. It
creates systems that discourage over-reliance on government programs and forces citizens to takes
greater steps toward self-reliance.

Study 2 Anti Welfare Reform Manipulation
DIRECTIONS: Please read the following article, written by a university professor, about welfare
reform. Please read carefully, you will be asked questions about this article later.
Welfare Reform: A Poor Solution
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, the most
comprehensive overhaul of the welfare system, was signed into law. This law reduced funding for
the 60-year-old safety net, leaving millions of poor families with fewer resources. The new system
has negatively impacted the poor, as well as the nation, in many ways: far fewer working families
receive government assistance to cover child-care costs, which has forced many to leave the work
force in order to care for their families. The net result is a decrease in the percentage of poorer
people earning paychecks, bringing the proportion of the working poor down to 38 percent.
Because of the drop in the number of those working, 71 percent of these lower-income families
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are in desperate need of assistance, and the national economy has been harmed by the loss of
people in the workforce.
Once, when people talked about welfare reform in the past, it meant trying to improve the
lives of people as service users, citizens and claimants. Now it is more likely to mean another
attack on people receiving benefits or a search for an easy way of making public spending cuts.
But we can expect to hear much more about welfare reform in the coming months, with politicians
on the lookout for easy targets for partisian points scoring.
One politician, speaking under terms of anonymity has recently said “[he has been]
coached by advisors to frame certain groups as “exploiting the system”. The groups who were
targeted are some of the poorest and most powerless in our society: single parents, mental health
service users, refugees and asylum seekers, the unemployed, and homeless. The source goes on to
say “…it is largely recognized that [these types of cuts] hurt more Americans than they help…but
[the groups affected by these cut] have few friends on Capital Hill, and garner little sympathy
from the American public.”
The irony is that this extreme approach to welfare reform generally has the opposite
effect to that promised, creating additional bureaucratic costs and waste through higher
unemployment and increased crime rates, overburdened hospitals and low-income children who
are more likely to drop out of school due to lack of resources. These effects may not be intended
and do little to improve economic or social conditions.

Appendix L
Morality Manipulation
Participants will read one of the following three sets of directions and respond
accordingly
Morality Condition: Please write in as much detail as possible about how your
beliefs about welfare reform are a core part of your moral beliefs and convictions.
or
Control Condition: Please describe in as much detail as possible the emotions that
the thought of experiencing dental pain arouses in you.
or
Dwelling Condition: Please write in as much detail as possible about all the ways
the article you just read could be correct. Please do your best think of several
reasons, and do not write about or pay attention to things that dispute or go
against what is written in the article.
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Appendix M
Moral Mandates: Social Distance
Directions: Please respond to the following statement on the scales provided:
I would be glad to have someone who does not share my views about
welfare reform:

1-----------2-----------3----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Strongly
Neutral
Strongly
Disagree
or Uncertain
Agree
As president of the U.S.
As a neighbor
As Governor of my state
To come and work at the same place I do
As a roommate.
To marry into my family
As someone I would personally date
As my personal physician
As a close personal friend
As the owner of a store or restaurant I frequent
As the teacher of my children
As my spiritual advisor

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
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Appendix N
Procedural Fairness
Directions: We want you to take a moment and imagine that Congress voted
today that welfare reform (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act described earlier) should be upheld. In other words, what if
Congress ruled today that welfare reform is a policy that should continue to be the
law?
Then, please respond to the questions on the scales that follow.

1-----------2-----------3----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Completely
Neutral
Completely
Unfair
or Uncertain
Fair
Do you support the decision made by Congress to
1
2
3
4
5
6
uphold welfare reform?
Do you think the decision made by Congress to
1
2
3
4
5
6
uphold welfare reform was fair or unfair?
Do you think it was fair or unfair of Congress to
1
2
3
4
5
6
uphold welfare reform?

7
7
7
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Appendix O
Vigilantism
Directions: Please respond to the following questions on the scales provided

1-----------2-----------3----------4-----------5-----------6-----------7
Completely
Neutral
Completely
Disagree
or Uncertain
Agree
Politicians who decide to uphold welfare reform
need to be stopped, even if it requires illegal
1
2
3
4
5
6
action.
Politicians who rule to uphold welfare reform
should be stopped at any cost, even if it is against 1
2
3
4
5
6
the law.
Politicians who decide that welfare reform should
be upheld deserve to loose their jobs, even if it is
1
2
3
4
5
6
under false pretenses.

7

7

7
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Appendix P
Demographics
Please answer the following questions about yourself. Choose the best answer.
1. What is your gender? Male /Female / Other__________
2. What is your ethnicity?
<1> African-American/Black
<2> White/European American
<3> Middle Eastern/Middle Eastern American
<4> Asian/Asian-American
<5> Latino/a
<6> Multiracial/Other (please specify)__________________
3. Were you born in the United States?

Yes / No

4. Approximately, what is your FAMILY’s annual income?
<1> Under $20,000
<2> $20,000 to $39,999
<3> $40,000 to $59,999
<4> $60,000 to $79,999
<5> $80,000 to $99,999

<6> $100,000 to $119,999
<7> $120,000 to $139,999
<8> $140,000 to $159,999
<9> $160,000 to $179,999
<10> $180,000 and over

5. What is your age? ________ years old
6. When it comes to economic policy do you usually consider yourself a liberal,
moderate, or conservative?
1
strong
conservative
liberal
conservative

2
liberal
strong

3
leaning

4

liberal

5
moderate

6
leaning

7

conservative

7. When it comes to social policy do you usually consider yourself a liberal,
moderate or conservative?
1
strong
conservative
liberal
conservative

2
liberal
strong

3
leaning
liberal

4

5
moderate
conservative

6
leaning

7
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8. What is your current class standing?
<1> Freshman
<2> Sophomore
<3> Junior

<4> Senior
<5> Graduate
<6> Other (please specify)__________________

9. When it comes to religion, do you consider yourself:
<1> Christian (e.g. Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, non-denominational,
etc.)
<2> Buddhist
<3> Muslim
<4> Hindu
<5> Jewish
<6> Atheist
<7> Agnostic
<8> Other (please specify)________________________________
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